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Abstract
Computer-based advisory systems form with their users composite, human-machine systems.
Redundancy and diversity between the human and the machine are often important for the
dependability of such systems. We describe a case study on assessing failure probabilities for
the analysis of X-ray ﬁlms for detecting cancer, performed by a person assisted by a computer-
based tool. Diﬀerently from most approaches to human reliability assessment, we focus on
the eﬀects of failure diversity – or correlation – between humans and machines. We illustrate
some of the modelling and prediction problems, especially those caused by the presence of the
human component. We show two alternative models, with their pros and cons, and illustrate,
via numerical examples and analytically, some interesting and non-intuitive answers to questions
about reliability assessment and design choices for human-computer systems.
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11 Introduction
Most computer systems are used as part of larger human-machine systems. Aircraft are controlled
by pilots in combination with multiple computer systems; patients are cured by doctors using
diagnostic and advisory computer systems; bank tellers are assisted by computers; and so on.
The success of an aircraft ﬂight, a patient’s treatment or a bank transaction thus hinges on the
dependability of a composite, human-machine system. To assess or to reduce the risk of these
activities, one needs to study the dependability of such composite systems. There is now an
established (and yet controversial) body of techniques for assessing human reliability, and another
body of techniques for computer dependability. Yet our grasp of the dependability of systems
including the two is still unsatisfactory. We report some work now under way within a U.K.-funded
interdisciplinary project, DIRC (the Interdisciplinary Research Collaboration on the Dependability
of computer-based systems) which is addressing some of the open problems.
We focus on an interesting broad category of human-machine systems: those in which a single
human uses a computer to support his/her decisions. We discuss a case study about dependability
assessment for a system of this kind.
An important aspect in the dependability of human-machine systems is the fault tolerance
provided by diverse redundancy in the co-operation between machines and their human users. For
instance, in our chosen category – single-user advisory systems – both the human and the machine
can perform a large part of each other’s tasks, and form, in this sense, a redundant system, of which
the human and the machine are subsystems. In normal operation, the human and the machine
often perform diﬀerent subtasks (e.g., the machine is used for searching information in databases,
and the human user thus does not need to search manually through paper literature): their co-
operation improves the performance that could be obtained from the human alone. However, if
one of the two subsystems fails to perform properly, the redundancy between them is brought to
bear. Both the human and the machine subsystems usually have some ability to detect errors
of the other, and to recover from some such errors (not necessarily the same subset) if detected.
E.g., when the machine’s database search function appears not to work, the human can obtain the
required information by reading literature.
Our case study concerns “computer-aided detection” in the interpretation of X-ray ﬁlms, used in
screening programmes for detecting breast cancer. Interpreting these X-ray images is a specialistic,
diﬃcult tasks, and computerised aids have been developed to help with it. Our interest in the
problem arose in relation to clinical trials being conducted for a speciﬁc model of computer aid
[2], but what we report here is related to general issues with this application area, and advisory
systems in general, rather than to a particular product.
The purposes of dependability modelling are: i) to evaluate a complete system and thus support
decisions about accepting or not accepting it for use; ii) to support decisions about how to design
a new system or improve an existing one. We use standard, “clear-box” modelling, describing
system reliability as a function of component reliability. This diﬀers from the typical approach
to the evaluation of products in medicine, which compares the eﬀectiveness of medical activities
with and without the product via “black box” measurements on clinical trials. We conjecture
that in this case, in which the computerised aid is a well-deﬁned components in a larger system,
a clear box approach will be beneﬁcial. Of special concern is the fact that controlled trials cannot
always reproduce the circumstances of clinical practice. For the trial of this computerised tool, for
instance, the set of cases used was chosen to have a much higher proportion of cancers than that
(less than 1%) of the screened population. This is necessary to make the trial reasonably short,
but may well aﬀect the performance of the human users and thus distort the results. Decisions
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trial to an educated guess about the eﬀects in the ﬁeld. An advantage of “clear box” reliability
modelling is precisely the ability to predict dependability measures for a future or hypothetical
system, or an existing system when used under diﬀerent circumstances; one can compare alternative
system designs, which in this case may include changes to the design of the machine, the choice
or training of users and/or the procedures of use. In the case of a human-machine system, one
must also consider that the detailed understanding of each component and its failure processes
belongs to practitioners of diﬀerent disciplines, like engineers and psychologists. Explicit system
dependability modelling is meant to help in connecting together these various, partial views and
understanding their system-level implications.
In view of the redundancy and diversity present in a human-machine system, we apply a
modelling approach which we have found useful in analyzing issues of diversity and common-
mode failure in redundant systems [5]: we use a coarse-grained subdivision of the system into
components, plus analysis of component dependability conditional on classes of demands, and how
its variation generates correlation between their failures.
In the next section, we outline the background of this study: the use of computer-aided detec-
tion in breast screening and the way we are going to study it in terms of redundancy and diversity.
Section 3 considers a reliability model for this system, derived directly from its intended mode of
operation, and concludes that it is unsuitable; Section 4 proposes an alternative, less usual model.
Sections 5 and 6 deal, respectively via examples and analytically, with using the latter model to
predict the probability of failure of the system in new circumstances, and the eﬀects of design
improvements. A Conclusions section follows.
2 Background
2.1 Computer aids for mammography
The human-machine system we consider – Fig 1 – involves a human expert (“reader”) using a
computerised aid in screening “mammograms” (X-ray ﬁlms) for signs of cancer. The function of
the system is to decide whether the patient should be “recalled” for further tests because there is
suspicion of cancer, or instead informed that no problem was found. The computerised aid used
(CADT henceforth, for “computer-aided detection tool”) processes a digitised version of the X-ray
ﬁlm, applying pattern recognition algorithms to recognize and highlight (with conventional marks –
“prompts” – on the image) those features in the picture that the reader should examine. The design
goal for the CADT is to aid the reader to notice all the features in a mammogram that ought to be
examined as potential indications of cancer. The task of producing a “recall/no recall” decision is
seen as having two components – detecting relevant features, and classifying them as representing
probable cancers or not – and it is in the “detection” component that pattern-matching algorithms
are expected to help the human reader, compensating e.g. for lapses of attention.
The reader receives (on ﬁlm and/or on a screen) the original X-ray images plus copies with the
“prompts” added by the CADT.
There are two ways that the reader’s decision can be wrong: a “false negative” decision, in
which a patient with cancer is not recalled, and a “false positive” one, in which a healthy patient is
recalled. Decisions about how to organise the screening have to take into account the probabilities
of both kinds of undesired outcome, and seek a reasonable trade-oﬀ between their frequencies.
Many studies both of results of clinical use and of controlled experiments have been conducted
to estimate the eﬀectiveness of this kind of systems (e.g. [6, 3, 8]). The results of these studies
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Figure 1: Role of a computer-assisted detection tool (CADT) in decisions on breast X-rays. The
system that produces decisions has two components, the CADT and its user, the reader.
have varied, though several have shown this kind of computer aids to improve the probability of
cancers being detected.
2.2 Redundancy and diversity
The function of the CADT is to detect and highlight those features that a reader should examine
in a mammogram, even when the reader alone does not notice them. In this sense, the CADT
provides fault tolerance within the system.
There are two possible components in the advantage given by the CADT (or by a second
reader, as in current practice in the U.K.). The ﬁrst is simple redundancy, i.e. the advantage of
repeating a task that is known to be subject to random errors: the chance of a feature escaping
detection twice is lower than that of escaping it once. The second advantage is “diversity”, related
to the fact that errors have a systematic component as well: each human reader, and each pattern
recognition algorithm, will be more likely to make mistakes on certain cases than on others. An
algorithm (a CADT) which were especially good at detecting those cancers that are most diﬃcult
for readers to detect could be very useful, even if it were much less good on most other cancers.
Practitioners are aware of these issues, at an informal level, but we want to make it possible to
discuss them in a more formal, mathematical way: informal reasoning may miss important aspects
of the problem, both in assessing dependability and in deciding on design options. For instance,
we would hope to help to identify any circumstances in which a designer should aim to increase
the failure diversity between a machine and its human users, even at the cost of decreasing the
eﬀectiveness of the machine if considered in isolation from its users.
2.3 Terminology and modelling approach for the redundant system
We will call a case or input case or demand the set of ﬁlms about a single patient. The system
produces a decision whether to “recall” the patient as a probable cancer case, or not to (so, this
is a single bit of information). A system failure is a wrong decision. System failures may be “false
negative” decisions or“ false positive” decisions. Our modelling approach describes the two kinds
of failure by identical equations. For reasons of space, in this paper we only describe the model for
false negatives. We plan later to address the trade-oﬀs between the probabilities of the two kind
of failure. So, for the rest of this paper we only consider patients that have cancer, and when we
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Figure 2: Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) for the “parallel detection” model of computer-assisted
detection.
write “failure” this can only mean a false negative.
Our system – Fig 1 – has two subsystems: the CADT and the human reader. The reader’s
decision is the output of the whole system: reader failures and system failures coincide. Likewise,
the CADT may have false negative failures (not highlighting the ﬁlm features that indicate a
cancer), or false positive ones (highlighting features in ﬁlms of patients who do not have cancer).
This system is somewhat unusual for reliability engineers, in two ways:
• the failure probabilities that we will be discussing are somewhat high. The probabilities of
(false negative) failure of readers in this decision task may be well over 10%;
• failures may not be due to any physical fault, or to anything that we would normally call
a design or implementation ﬂaw in the CADT. A CADT “failure” may be just the eﬀect of
unavoidable limitations of pattern-matching algorithms; or it might be due to a coding error
in producing the software, and our model would not make any distinction between the two
cases. Likewise, a reader’s “failure” in this terminology is any wrong decision, even if it may
be the best decision feasible under the circumstances (e.g. if the mammogram’s appearance
is misleading).
3 A dependability model based on the intended procedure of use
of the CADT
The CADT and the reader can be co-ordinated in at least two ways:
1. the reader examines the ﬁlms alone, then considers the output of the machine –based on the
same ﬁlms–, and then the reader reviews his/her judgement. Ideally, whenever the CADT
highlights a feature in the ﬁlms, the readers will examine it with the same attention and skill
as the features that they noticed themselves.
2. the machine processes the ﬁlms ﬁrst, and then the reader processes together both the original
evidence and the machine’s “annotations” on it.
The ﬁrst procedure seems more consistent with the design rationale of the CADT, and safe-
guards better the reader’s ability to reach a conclusion without being biased by the machine’s
output. By design, this CADT is intended only to suggest features that the reader should ex-
amine. It is not intended to suggest a decision nor to cause the user to ignore those parts of a
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couraged from using the CADT as a diagnostic system, and the message is reinforced by presenting
the CADT’s output on low-resolution copies of the mammograms.
With this procedure, we can separately consider the two parts of the decision-producing activ-
ity: detecting important features in the ﬁlms, for which the reader is helped by the CADT, and
classifying them.
Any feature that the reader should examine in the classiﬁcation part of the task is actually
examined, provided that either the reader or the CADT “notices” it. In the subtask of detecting
features, there is 1-out-of-2, parallel redundancy between the reader and the CADT. Proper clas-
siﬁcation, instead, depends on the reader alone: if the reader misclassiﬁes the important features,
the system fails. Figure 2 depicts this “parallel detection” scenario. It can be read as showing the
ﬂow of information, from left to right, through the functions of the system components, but also as
a reliability block diagram: the system does not fail on a case iﬀ there is at least one path joining
the points at the left-hand and right-hand ends of the diagram without encountering a component
that fails on that case.
Mathematically, we can describe the probability of a false negative as follows. Given a case,
randomly chosen from the subset of people, within the population to be screened, who have cancer,
we wish to describe the probability of a [false] negative decision. We write:
P (false negative failure of the system) =
P (Mf AND Hmiss) + P (NOT(Mf AND Hmiss) AND Hmisclass)
(1)
Where Mf , Hmiss, Hmisclass designate these events:
• Mf (“machine fails”): “false negative” failure of the CADT: the CADT does not prompt
any feature[s] in the mammogram that would indicate cancer;
• Hmiss (“human misses”): “false negative” failure of the reader in the detection task, deﬁned
in the same way as for the CADT;
• Hmisclas (“human misclassiﬁes”): “false negative” failure of the reader in the classiﬁcation
task: the reader takes the wrong decision on a case although the relevant features have been
identiﬁed for his/her analysis.
The probabilities of these events can, in principle, be estimated from results of evaluation trials.
However, there are some complications. This model would be very convenient if:
1. we could estimate the parameters of the various blocks separately, even when not connected
in the system (e.g., from the abundant data on readers’ performance without the CADT),
as we would expect to do with a hardware reliability model;
2. we could assume independence between the failures of the various blocks, so that we could
write:
P (false negative failure of the system) =
PMf · PHmiss + PHmisclass · (1− PMf · PHmiss)
(2)
About point (1), unfortunately, it is not clear that the performance of readers, in either the
detection or the classiﬁcation task, is not aﬀected by the presence of the CADT.
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Figure 3: System structure and information ﬂow in the sequential case
About point (2), we do not expect this independence to hold. It is true that the reader and
the CADT perform the detection step separately, but this only implies that the probability of the
reader detecting the relevant features in a mammogram depends on the mammogram itself but not
on the CADT’s reaction to it. Given this “conditional independence”, the probability of failure of
the detection part of the task could be written as [5]):
P (detectionfailure) =PMf · PHmiss + cov(PMf , PHmiss). (3)
where the term PMf ·PHmiss is the probability of detection failure if the CADT and the reader
failed independently. The new term cov(PMf , PHmiss) is the covariance between the probabilities
of failure of the CADT and the reader conditional on each speciﬁc case. If and only if this term is
0, detection failures by the CADT and the reader are indeed independent. High covariance would
indicate that cases on which the reader is likely to miss the important features are those on which
the CADT is also likely to miss them: the advantage given by the CADT is then less than if it
failed with the same probability PMf , but independently of the reader’s failures. If negative, it
indicates the opposite, i.e. that there is useful “diversity” between the two. It is not clear a priori
how feasible it would be to estimate the covariance term.
Another problem with this model is that the two steps “Human detects” and “Human classiﬁes”
are not physically separate. That is, readers may not be consciously performing two diﬀerent,
separate steps. We do not know how to identify the information that is the output of the ﬁrst step
and input to the second. So, there are serious diﬃculties in evaluating the parameters P (Hmiss)
and P (Hmisclas).
Last, but not least, we cannot be assured that the procedure followed actually guarantees even
conditional independence between failures of the three blocks in Fig. 2. E.g., can we assume that
the reader’s classiﬁcation of a feature in the mammogram is the same independently of whether
it was detected by the reader him/herself or by the CADT, or both? If we cannot, i.e. readers
violate, at least unconsciously, our simplifying assumptions, this model is no longer attractive.
All these doubts imply that it may be desirable to design the procedures of use with the explicit
goal of satisfying the assumptions that would make this model practical. However, without evidence
that they are indeed satisﬁed we need a more general model.
4 A less restrictive model: “Sequential” operation
We have seen that, despite the apparent advantages of the procedure described, it is not clear
that it is actually followed to the point that the “parallel detection” model can be considered
7valid. Procedure 2) on p. 4, with the reader examining at the same time the mammogram and
the CADT’s output, seems faster and a better use of the machine’s support to save human labour,
at the cost of the CADT’s output possibly biasing the reader. It also seems to be the procedure
assumed in some evaluation trials of mammogram-reading aids. In practice, in clinical trials or
actual practice, the readers can be asked to use the “parallel detection” procedure, but there are
not necessarily constraints or “aﬀordances” in the experimental or clinical set-up to ensure that
they would not use the other one, perhaps unconsciously.
This scenario is best described by the simple diagram in Figure 3. The reader receives infor-
mation that has been pre-processed by the CADT. We no longer assume that we can identify two
separate phases in the reader’s activity, nor that any part of the reader’s task is unaﬀected by the
CADT’s output. Fig. 3, diﬀerently from Fig. 2, cannot be interpred as a reliability block diagram.
We name the events of interest:
• Mf (“machine fails”): “false negative” failure of the CADT, deﬁned as before;
• Hf (“human fails”): “false negative” failure of the reader and thus system failure: “no recall”
decision for a patient with cancer;
• Ms = Mm: “machine succeeds”, i.e. the negation of “machine fails”.
Then,
P (false negative failure of the system) = P (human fails) ,
and to represent the eﬀect of the CADT on the human’s results, we rewrite this in terms of the
conditional probabilities of human failure, given that the CADT fails or that it succeeds:
P (Hf) = P (Hf |Ms) · P (Ms) + P (Hf |Mf) · P (Mf) (4)
If it happened that P (Hf |Ms) = P (Hf |Mf), the success or failure of the reader would be –
on average – independent of whether the CADT succeeds or fails.
This model is less restrictive than the “Parallel detection” one: there are no assumptions
constraining how the behaviour of the CADT aﬀects the reader. By varying the values of the
model’s parameters, any conceivable form of this inﬂuence of the CADT can be represented.
As a next step, we must take into account the fact that the failure probabilities of both machine
algorithms and readers vary with the characteristics of their inputs: some cases are more diﬃcult
than others. We describe this variation by additional parameters – the probabilities of the various
events, conditional on each possible input case. To emphasise that each such conditional probability
is a function of the input case, we indicate them as functions. For instance, with reference to the
“sequential operation” model just described:
• pMf (x) designates the probability of false negative failure of the CADT on a speciﬁc case x;
• pHf |Ms(x) - designates the probability of false negative failure of the reader on a speciﬁc case
x for which the CADT succeeded (highlighted all features relevant for a decision).
Mathematically, the meanings of these parameters are, e.g.:
pMf (x) = P (Mf |the given case is x) =
P (Mf AND the given case is x)
P (the given case is x)
(5)
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pHf |Ms(x) =P (Hf |Ms AND the given case is x) =
P (Hf AND Ms AND the given case is x)
P (Ms AND the given case is x)
(6)
These conditional probabilities can be said to characterise how diﬃcult a case is, for a certain
task performed on it. E.g., pMf (x) > pMf (y) indicates that case x is such that the CADT is more
likely to fail on it than on case y. The diﬃculty for the CADT may be due to design choices,
perhaps required to reduce false positive failures for some class of cases, or to design mistakes
(bugs in the software), or to unavoidable limits of image-processing algorithms. A case that is
more diﬃcult than another for the CADT may or may not be more diﬃcult for the readers as well.
The probability of false negative failures at the system level depends on how the “diﬃculty”
of cases for the CADT correlates with their “diﬃculty” for the readers, and, crucially, how likely
the various cases are. To represent this latter aspect, we deﬁne the demand profile:
p(x) = P (the input case given to the system is case x)
The probability of system failure on a randomly chosen case is then:
PHf =
∑
x
p(x) · [PHf |Ms(x)PMs(x) + PHf |Mf (x)PMf (x)] (7)
We do not show the similar development for the “Parallel detection” case, which leads to
equation (3) for the detection task.
The model as described has three parameters for each possible case that may be presented to
the system. Since each case is in some respect diﬀerent from all others, it is infeasible to estimate
these parameters. What can be done is to estimate the failure probabilities for classes of similar
demands. So, in a controlled trial of the system, we would ﬁrst subdivide the cases into classes.
Equation 7 is still valid, if we interpret each x as representing a whole class of demands:
PHf =
∑
x∈{classes of cases}
p(x) · [PHf |Ms(x)PMs(x) + PHf |Mf (x)PMf (x)] (8)
For each class of cases, we need to estimate the parameters PHf |Ms(x), PMs(x), PHf |Mf (x).
We would think that two demands belong to the same class if they are equivalent under all respects
that signiﬁcantly aﬀect the diﬃculty of dealing with them correctly, both for the reader and for
the CADT algorithms. I.e., the two demands are practically indistinguishable from the viewpoint
of the failure probabilities they produce: all the demands in the same class have similar values of
pMf (x), pHf |Mf(x), and pHf |Ms(x)1. In practice, we would try to classify the cases according to
various characteristics that are easy to identify and produce a feasibly small number of classes.
1Identical values of pMf (x), pHf |Mf (x), and pHf |Ms(x) for all x in a class are a suﬃcient condition for one to be
able to reuse, for predictions in a new environment of use of the CADT, the parameter values estimated, for classes
of demands, in another environment. One can also deﬁne less restrictive suﬃcient conditions for this re-use to be
sound. In any case, whether these conditions hold is essential for deciding how to use these models, and determining
it with conﬁdence will often be diﬃcult, as usual in this kind of statistical analysis.
95 Extrapolation from controlled trials to results in the ﬁeld
In deciding about the adoption of the CADT in a new environment, or on possible design changes to
the CADT or its use, it will be necessary to rely on measurements taken under diﬀerent conditions
from those for which the prediction is sought. For instance, the measurements may be taken in
a controlled trial, which may by necessity be run under diﬀerent conditions (especially, diﬀerent
demand proﬁle) than those of actual clinical use. Equation (8):
PHf =
∑
x∈{classes of cases}
p(x) · [PHf |Ms(x)PMs(x) + PHf |Mf (x)PMf (x)]
is the key to this kind of extrapolation.
Changes in the conditions of use of the CADT or its characteristics can be represented by
changing the values of parameters in this equation. Consider ﬁrst the direct eﬀects of such changes
in the conditions of use, for instance:
1. the frequencies of diﬀerent kinds of cases may be diﬀerent. Provided that a useful classi-
ﬁcation of the cases into classes is found, such that equation 8 is a suitable description of
the probability of wrong decision, these changes would be represented by changes of the
parameters p(x) (one for each category x) in the equation;
2. the readers have varying levels of ability (represented by the parameters PHf |Ms(x) and
PHf |Mf (x)). The trial data can indicate the range of these abilities, show whether there
are strong discrepancies between humans, and if these aﬀect diﬀerent categories of demands
diﬀerently (as is believed to be the case);
3. the behaviour of the readers, and thus PHf |Ms(x) and PHf |Mf (x), will evolve over time as
they learn more about the behaviour of the CADT, e.g., becoming more complacent about
relying on its prompts, or more skilled in detecting its failures;
4. the probabilities of success or failure of the CADT, PMs(x) and PMf (x) = 1− PMs(x), may
change due e.g. to maintenance practices, systematic diﬀerences in ﬁlm characteristics, better
detection algorithms, diﬀerent tuning of the detection algorithms (which may be decided as
a consequence of measuring their performance), and so on.
There may be indirect eﬀects as well. For instance, a large enough change in the prevalence of
cancers (or of diﬀerent categories of cancers) in the population of cases (item 1 in the list above),
may change the readers’ failure probabilities, PHf |Ms(x) and PHf |Mf (x). To guess the range of
magnitude of the changes, we would need to rely on measurements of similar eﬀects on human
behaviours in similar tasks. The equation will show the corresponding ranges of uncertainty in
the predicted probability of system failure. Another example is that changing the frequency of
failures of the CADT, PMf , may aﬀect the tendency of readers to depend on its outputs more
or less in formulating their own decisions, thus indirectly changing PHf |Ms(x) and PHf |Mf (x) as
well. Pertinent literature from research on cognition and HCI can inform conjectures about these
changes.
We now illustrate some of these extrapolation steps on a numerical example. The parameter
values we use do not necessarily represent the performance of any real CADT, but their orders of
magnitude are realistic, as is their variation between classes of cases. It is essential to consider
the dependence of the probability of failure on the type of demand. In this example, we assume
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that there are essentially just two categories of cases, which we have labelled here as “easy” and
“diﬃcult”. An experimenter has run a trial on the human-machine system and obtained the
estimates shown in the table below for the model parameters. We assume for the sake of simplicity
that narrow enough conﬁdence intervals can be obtained for all parameters.
classes of cases Demand proﬁles Model parameters
Trial Field PMf PMs PHf |Mf PHf |Ms
easy 0.8 0.9 0.07 0.93 0.18 0.14
diﬃcult 0.2 0.1 0.41 0.59 0.9 0.4
The two categories of cases are represented in proportions of 80% “easy” and 20% “diﬃcult”.
Suppose that the actual proportions in the ﬁeld are 90% vs 10%. Clearly, to predict failure
probabilities in the ﬁeld one will need to adjust for this diﬀerent “demand proﬁle“.
The next table shows the diﬀerence between the dependability that will be observed in the
ﬁeld and that in the trial. So far, we do not need our complete model which identiﬁes the roles of
the machine and the human in system failure: all that we are doing is using, in the bottom line,
weighted sums of the probabilities of system failures for the two categories of cases.
Probability of system failure
easy cases 0.143
diﬃcult cases 0.605
Trial Field
all cases 0.235 0.189
Suppose now that designers wish to improve the CADT, reducing its probability of false neg-
ative failure. They would want to predict the eﬀects of this improvement on the dependability of
the human-machine system, and to decide where they should concentrate eﬀorts towards improve-
ment. Apart from cost constraints, for pattern detection problems it is often possible to reduce
greatly (for either a human or an automated algorithm) the probability of false negative failures if
one is willing to accept a corresponding increase in false positive failures. However, the latter may
make the CADT useless. Our hypothetical designers consider two alternative improvements to the
CADT: a reduction by 10 of the failure probability PMf for the “easy” (and frequent) cases, or a
similar reduction limited to the “diﬃcult” (and rarer) cases. The following table gives the results
of applying equation (8) to these scenarios, both for the “Trial” and for the “Field” proﬁles:
Probability of system failure
CADT improved for easy cases CADT improved for diﬃcult cases
easy cases 0.140 0.143
diﬃcult cases 0.605 0.421
Trial Field Trial Field
all cases 0.233 0.187 0.198 0.171
The probabilities of failures under the two demand proﬁles (Trial and Field) diﬀer, as would
be expected. As for the eﬀects of reducing the CADT’s failure probabilities for the “easy” or for
the “diﬃcult” cases, we see that neither produces large improvements (compared to the bottom
line of the previous table). The “easy” cases are the majority, so one might expect that reducing
the CADT’s failure probabilities by a factor of 10 on these cases would greatly improve the overall
situation. This is not so, however. The failure probability for the “Field” proﬁle is only reduced to
0.187, vs the 0.189 of the unimproved CADT. The reason is in the diﬀerence between the values of
PHf |Mf and PHf |Ms for these cases: only 0.04. Although the improved CADT gives correct outputs
11
much more often, this improvement does not greatly aﬀect the reader’s performance on those cases.
Instead, the diﬀerence PHf |Mf −PHf |Ms is larger for the “diﬃcult” cases, and accordingly reducing
the CADT’s failure probability for these cases yields greater improvement in overall probability of
failure (0.171 vs 0.189, for the “Field” proﬁle; 0.198 vs 0.235, for the “Trial” proﬁle).
This example illustrate some properties of this model, which we discuss in the next section.
6 An analysis of human-machine interaction
6.1 Importance index
If we deﬁne t(x) = PHf/Mf (x)− PHf/Ms(x), we can rewrite equation (8) as
PHf =
∑
x
p(x) · [PHf |Ms(x)PMs(x) + PHf |Mf (x)PMf (x)] =
∑
x
p(x) · [PHf |Ms(x) · (1− PMf (x)) + PHf |Mf (x)PMf (x)] =
∑
x
p(x) · [PHf |Ms(x) + PMf (x) · t(x)]
(9)
This says that the probability of reader failure (false negative decision) is given by the proba-
bility of him/her failing given correct output by the CADT, plus the probability of the CADT not
giving correct output (failing), multiplied by a term t(x).
The term t(x) seems a useful general measure of how much the decision support oﬀered by
an automated system aﬀects a human user’s success or failure. t(x) is an “importance index” (of
the CADT for the whole system) [1], or a “coherence index” (of the reader’s behaviour with the
CADT’s advice). E.g., if t(x) = 1, then (since probabilities can only have values between 0 and
1) PHf/Mf (x) = 1 and PHf/Ms(x) = 0, i.e., the reader’s decision is correct (with probability 1) if
and only if the CADT’s output is.
One may think that t(x) measures how much the rate of success of humans without CADT
help would be increased by the support of a (perfectly reliable) CADT. This is not necessarily
true, because we have no evidence that a human given wrong advice by the CADT would perform
just as well (or as badly) as without any advice. For instance, suppose that readers come to
mistrust the CADT and disregard its output completely. Then, t(x) = 0 for every case. Yet, the
readers’ failure probability may be just as without the CADT, or it may diﬀer, e.g. because the
CADT is a distracting factor.
Fig. 4 shows the implications of equation (9), for a given value of t(x): the y axis is the
probability of (false negative) system failure as a function of the probability of failure of the
CADT (horizontal axis). The term t is represented by the slope of the line. The line shows
how much better or worse we could make the system if we modiﬁed the CADT, changing PMf
(uniformly for all classes of cases), without changing PHf |Ms and PHf |Mf , i.e. the way the reader
reacts (statistically) to failures and successes of the CADT.
In particular, equation 9 and Fig. 4 show that, for given PHf |Mf and PHf |Ms, there is a lower
bound for the probability of system failure: this is PHf |Ms, represented by the point on the left
where the sloping line intersects the y axis. No improvement in the machine will reduce this failure
probability, unless we also change the reader’s skills.
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Figure 4: Role of the factor t(x): probability of system failure as a function of the probability
of machine failure for a class of cases, given that the importance index t is known and ﬁxed (the
reader’s reactions to the CADT’s failures/successes do not change).
Of course, we should expect this ﬁgure only to be a good guide given small changes of PMf ,
as t may not remain constant as the CADT is changed: for instance, readers might react to a
perceived better dependability of the CADT by unconsciously becoming less attentive. This is one
of the possible “indirect” eﬀects discussed in the previous section. However, false negative failures
of the CADT are very rare: PMf is small by design (at the cost of relatively frequent false positive
failures), and cancers are rare in the screened population. So, readers may not usually see enough
of them to be able to notice a reduction in their rate and adapt their own behaviour accordingly.
Then, the eﬀect of improving the CADT on system failure probability could be read on a graph
as in Fig. 4, once this had been produced by measuring PMf (x) and t(x) in ﬁeld usage.
6.2 Eﬀects of varying diﬃculty of cases: role of covariance
We can rewrite equation (9) as
PHf =
∑
x
p(x) · (PHf/Ms(x) + PMf (x) · t(x)) =
E[PHf/Ms(x)] + E[PMf (x)] · E[t(x)]+
+covx(PMf (x), t(x)) =
E[PHf/Ms(x)] + PMf · E[t(x)] + covx(PMf (x), t(x))
(10)
The “covariance” term highlights the importance of how the two measures, PMf (x) and t(x),
vary among cases. Knowing both the average probability of failure of the CADT and the average
eﬀect of the CADT’s failure on the reader is not enough to determine the probability of system
failure, because of the additional term covx(PMf (x), t(x)) in the equation. Rather, if those cases on
which the CADT is more likely to fail (high PMf (x)) tend to be those for which the reader is more
likely to be aﬀected by the CADT’s failure (high “importance index” t(x)), then the probability
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of false negative will be worse than the means would make us expect; and vice versa. For the
designer of the CADT, this means that improving the CADT’s failure probability on average over
all kinds of cases may not be very useful. It may be more useful to concentrate any improvements
on cases for which readers have a high t(x) (and that are somewhat frequent).
We should note here a problem with identifying classes of cases with a high “importance index”
t(x) from experimental data. A high t(x) for a class x of cases may mean that it is a homogeneous
class of cases that are diﬃcult for the readers’ “detection” task, a diﬃculty that is greatly alleviated
by a correct output from the CADT. However, it might also mean that the class contains “easier”
cases on which both the CADT and the reader tend to succeed, and “more diﬃcult” ones on which
they both tend to fail. It would be better then to regard t(x) as just a “coherence index”. It may
be that within either subclass the reader is not aﬀected at all by whether the CADT’s output is
correct or erroneous. Only a more detailed analysis of the data (possibly requiring more extensive
trials, and possibly infeasible) could answer this question. This is a common problem in statistical
inference.
7 Conclusions
We have explored clear-box reliability modelling for an important class of human-machine systems
– humans using a computer in an advisory role – modelled as fault-tolerant systems.
The main practical advantages in this speciﬁc case is some help in extrapolating from measures
taken in a controlled trial to predictions of results in the ﬁeld in an orderly way. We have also
shown some insights that the modelling oﬀers into otherwise confusing complexities of the human-
machine system. E.g., in section 6.1, the limits on how much one can improve the system by only
improving the CADT; in section 6.2, the non-intuitive indication of how to choose classes of cases
to target for incremental improvements of the CADT.
From the viewpoint of dependability modelling in general, we have outlined some modelling
problems speciﬁc to human-machine systems, an alternative description approach to that of most
“human reliability assessment” methods, and some useful insights, as just described.
There are two kinds of observations that seem important:
• with failure probabilities for the two components that vary heavily between classes of cases, it
is essential in modelling to use detailed probabilities of component failure conditional on types
of demand, rather than marginal probabilities, and to avoid any unwarranted assumption of
independence between components. This is a problem that also aﬀects all reliability models
for systems without humans [5], [4];
• while models of the kind presented will predict the eﬀects of small changes in the system or its
environment of use, larger changes may aﬀect the dependability of the human components.
That is, changes in parameters like PMf may aﬀect parameters like PHf |Mf . Some may argue
that this makes these clear-box models useless, and only extensive empirical trials in realistic
conditions should be used to assess these human-machine systems. We observe instead that
such empirical trials may be infeasible, but the clear box model allows an analyst to take
account of any existing knowledge about how people’s reliability may change depending on
the characteristics of the machines they use and the demands they face.
Our case study is continuing with the analysis of data from recent trials of use of the CADT,
selecting alternative criteria for dividing the cases into classes, and incorporating research results
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from other disciplines to forecast the eﬀects of CADT reliability on user behaviour (for instance,
literature about “automation bias” [7]).
Of more general interest, in and beyond the medical application area, will be the study of
trade-oﬀs between the probabilities of false positive and false negative failures, a very common
problem. We would attempt to describe, for instance, how alternative settings (compromises
between false negative and false positive rates) of the CADT would aﬀect the whole system’s false
negative and false positive rates.
We are also considering looking at more complex systems that include advisory computer
products. We have so far only modelled the behaviour of the simple system composed of a single
human user assisted by a machine. But more complex combinations have also been considered for
use of the CADT, to improve the cost-eﬀectiveness of screening programmes; e.g. with two readers
assisted by a CADT, or less qualiﬁed readers assisted by CADTs. By modelling these alternatives,
we expect to explore modelling problems that are relevant to wider classes of advisory systems.
In conclusion, this style of modelling appears promising for the broad category of systems,
“humans using advisory systems”, of which computer-aided screening is an example. There is
nothing especially new in applying the engineering style of reliability modelling to systems including
humans and machines, but we believe that our focus on diversity aspects is novel and important.
In particular, it helps to avoid major pitfalls of reliability modelling – unjustiﬁed independence
assumptions and unwarranted predictions based on average parameter values – and to clarify
which improvements to either the computer or human parts of the system will produce tangible
improvements for the system as a whole. This is just the ﬁrst case study of its kind that we know
of. In addition to any conclusions we obtain about the case study itself, we expect it to generate
knowledge of more general interest, in terms of models, lessons learned about how to abstract the
interaction between humans and machines, and data collection problems.
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